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Three Essays in Formal Ontology 
Prefatory Note 
When first reading Husserl's Logical Invesligationsit is very e<lsy to pass 
by the third as a minor detour from the high road of Husserl's major con-
cerns. In common with many other readers, I initially held this view: the 
many distinctions Husserl makes seemed to me to be, to use his own 
words about Twardowski, 'as subtle as they are queer'. To anyone ac-
customed only to the extensional whole-part theories of Lesniewski or 
Goodman this is a natural reaction. My change of view was influenced 
partly by Kevin Mulligan's insistence on the pivotal role of the third in-
vestigation in Husserl's work, and also by the increasing recognition of 
the themes of unity, dependence and self-sufficiency treated by Husserl, 
as concepts echoing loudly throughout the history of ontology. It was al-
so Kevin Mulligan who unearthed Ginsberg's 1929 article on Husserl's 
six theorems, and discontent with her criticisms spurred me to attempt a 
formalised reconstruction of Husserl's ideas, which met with various 
difficulties on the way to the first of these essays. 
At the same time I was attempting to use mereological considerations 
to offer an alternative to what I consider the unacceptable account of 
number put forward by Frege, using Schroderian and Husserlian ideas 
suggested to me by Barry Smith. My original view was that numbers are 
properties of what I then called manifolds, i.e. aggregates considered as 
composed in some determinate way. This is what I should now call a 
group or aggregate theory of number. In the second essay I present the 
considerations which forced me to abandon such a view and to recog-
nise the distinctive nature of pluralities as against aggregated individu-
als. This in turn led me to reappraise the notions of reference and set, 
with the result seen in the third essay, where a fonnal theory of mani-
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folds, now reconstrued as comprising both individuals and pluralities, is 
developed. Some manifolds are aggregable: to such aggregates mereo-
logical considerations still apply. These issues are dealt with in the sec-
ond essay, where the opposition to Frege is also explicitly set out. 
At each tum I found voices of encouragement from the past, some 
from unexpected quarters. Hearkening to these has convinced me that 
the logical and philosophical harvest of the fecund years between Hus-
serl's Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1891 and Russell's Principles of 
Mathematics in 1903 is yet far from being reaped in full. 
I. The Formalisation of Husserl's Theory of 
Wholes and Parts 1 
§ 1 Introduction 
Husserls's third Logical Investigation is called "On the theory of 
wholes and parts ". It has probably received less attention from com-
mentators than any of the other investigations, including the shorter 
fourth, which HusserI himself saw as an application of the ideas of the 
third to questions of grammar. The ideas put forward in the third investi-
gation playa crucial role in HusserI's subsequent philosophy, and he 
was able to recommend them, even much later in his life, as offering the 
best way into his philosophy.2 Although they did not perhaps present 
such an attractive clarion-call to research, they might, had Husserl's ad-
vice been followed, have made a much greater contribution to philoso-
phical work than in fact they did. I should like to suggest that it is not too 
late to learn from the third investigation, and that, in a tidier form than 
they there receive, the ideas could become indispensable weapons in the 
conceptual armoury of the philosopher interested in ontology. This pa-
per has the more modest purpose of attempting to clarify and interpret 
what Husserl was trying to say, with a view to eventually offering a ri-
gorous treatment of the most important notions, and I wish also briefly 
to suggest where such notions might prove important in ontology. 
It is important to distinguish formalisation from mere symbolisation. 
Any expression may be symbolised: one simply introduces symbols for 
various words or other expressions: the difference is merely one of the 
graphic shape of the expression. However, symbols, unlike the natural 
language expressions they can conventionally replace, derive their 
sense from the specific convention setting up their use, whereas this free-
dom of interpretation is not available for the original natural language 
expressions. For this reason symbols are more easily detachable from 
their specific interpretation, and may be manipulated purely syntacti-
cally, without interpretation. It is this feature which makes symbolisa-
tion such a useful way of presenting a formal theory. A formal theory, in 
HusserI's sense,3 is one in which no mention is made of any particular 
things or kinds of things, but which deals with objects in complete ab-
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straction from their specific natures. A formal theory need not even be 
expressed symbolically: a statement such as, 'If a thing bears a relation 
to another thing, then the second thing bears the converse relation to the 
first',4 contains no restriction to particular domains of application, but 
consists purely of logical constants and formal concepts, such as thing. 
relation. and concepts such as converse definable in terms of these. It is 
advantageous to present formal theories symbolically because we may 
use symbols which are not given any fixed interpretation, but belong to a 
grammatical class which corresponds to a formal concept; they are then 
free to vary in interpretation over any entities whatever falling under 
that formal concept. So, if we allow the usual sorts of formal grammar, 
the above formal statement, could be symbolised (If aRb then bRa). 
Symbolisation usually proceeds further, with symbolisation of the logi-
cal constants, which may indeed be necessary if they need some degree 
of regimentation for the specific purpose in hand. In this sense, a sym-
bolised presentation of a purely formal theory in Husserl's sense fulfils 
the conditions suggested by Wittgenstein as marking an adequate Be-
griffsschrift.5 Each formal concept corresponds to a different type ofvar-
iable,i. e. symbol with variable interpretation. Only the logical constants 
are fixed.6 
Husserl thought that a purely formal theory of part and whole was 
possible, and regarded the second part ofthe third investigation as offer-
ing the beginnings of such a theory. But, for all its detail, the investiga-
tion remains only a sketch of what a fully developed formal theory 
would look like, and like all philosophical sketches, presents problems 
of interpretation, lacunae, and vagueness, as well as being highly sug-
gestive of possible fruitful developments. Although Husserl makes a 
brief and somewhat half-hearted venture into a partial symbolisation of 
a few theorems, the investigation is largely couched in Husserl's semi-
technical German, and he nowhere attempts to set up a formal language 
in the modern logistic sense, which means that his formal treatment falls 
well short of modern standards in terms of the rigour of its symbolisa-
tion. While Husserl was by no means unfamiliar with symbolic logic as 
such, he was less interested in symbolisation for its own sake than in the 
philosophical treatment of concepts, even those concepts where, as in 
logic and mathematics, symbolisation had become indispensable to 
progress. He never believed that problems could be resolved purely by 
recourse to symbolisation, and rejected strongly formalist tendencies in 
mathematics, which would have us believe that mathematics is simply a 
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game with symbols which do not themselves have any meaning.7 It 
might be suggested that a theory of whole and part cannot be formal in 
Husserl's sense, since where - as in the work of Lesniewski and Good-
man - it has been formalised hitherto, it has proved to be a proper exten-
sion of logic in the normally accepted sense.8 Against this it must be 
pointed out that H usserl clearly states that whole and part are purely for-
mal concepts.9 Whether Husserl is correct on this, depends on what is 
taken as the criterion for being a formal concept. I do not believe that 
enough has as yet been done in clarifying the idea of a formal concept to 
give a definitive answer on this point. To that extent, the title of this essay 
promises something which it is not clear can be given. However, to the 
extent that we can eliminate from the theory all other concepts which are 
clearly not formal, to that extent we have succeeded in outlining what 
Husserl would call a theory of the pure forms of whole and part. IO 
Although advertised as a theory of whole and part, Husserl's investi-
gation spends as much time on the concepts of dependence and inde-
pendence, which, while they bear crucially on Husserl's particular 
brand of whole-part theory, cannot be counted as purely mereological 
notions. However, Husserllays great stress on the distinction between 
depender:tt and independent parts as being the chief distinction among 
parts, and since it is in this distinction that Husserl's theory is distin-
guished from later and symbolically more adequate whole-part the-
ories, I shall also consider the question of dependence and indepen-
dence in some detail. 
Husserl draws a distinction in the investigation between two different 
kinds of part or constituent of a whole. Some parts, those normally so-
called, could exist alone, detached from the whole of which they happen 
to be part. These Husserl cans 'pieces' or 'independent parts' of the 
whole. On the other hand there are parts or constitutents of a whole 
which could not exist apart from the whole or sort of whole of which 
they are part. These Husserl calls 'moments' or 'dependent parts' of the 
whole. For example: the board which makes up the top of a table is a 
piece of the table, while the surface of the table, or its particular individ-
ual colour-aspect, are moments of it. This distinction amongst kinds of 
parts is certainly not new: indeed it may be claimed to go back to the 
Categories of Aristotle. I I Husserl himself certainly derived the distinc-
tion from his teacher Stumpf, who used the terms 'partial content' and 
'independent content', in his discussion of the distinction within the 
realm of phenomenological psychologyY Husserl first used the distinc-
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tion himself in his 1894 article "Psychological studies in elementary log-
ic", where many of the distinctions later made in the Logicallnvesliga-
lions are already to be found. 13 The later exposition contains two major 
advances on the earlier version: firstly a recognition that the depend-
ent/independent distinction has application outside the sphere of psy-
chological contents to ontology generally, and secondly, connected 
with this, the idea of a formal theory of whole and part, which, as we 
have said, Husserl sketches but does not completely execute in the sec-
ond half of the investigation. 
In the hands of later whole-part theorists such as Lesniewski and 
Goodman, whole-part theory has become associated with nominalism 
and extensionalism, where its general applicability and algebraic simi-
larities with set theory make it a substitute for set theory more acceptable 
to those who have ontological objections to sets as abstract objects.14 
Part of the interest in examining Husserl's whole-part theory is that it is 
free from such nominalist scruples, being conceived within the richly 
Platonist ontology of pure species adopted by Husserl at the time. It is, 
furthermore, non-extensional, making indispensable use of the con-
cepts of essence and necessity. The basic distinction Husserl makes be-
tween dependent and independent parts is not even expressible in an ex-
tensional language. However it seems to me that one need not buy Hus-
serl's package of Platonism and non-extensional language as a whole in 
order to make use of his whole-part theory. It is usually taken for grant-
ed that a non-extensional language brings ontological commitment to 
Platonic entities of some kind, whether species, meanings, or something 
like possible worlds. But it is far from clear that we can even manage to 
make reasonable sense of the actual world in a purely extensional lan-
guage. It may, further, be possible to use a whole-part theory of Hus-
serl's type to buttress a more sophisticated nominalistic approach to uni-
versals via Husserlian moments, so the usual yoking together of Platon-
ism and non-extensionalism is far from clearly established. 
One of the problems with the interpretation of the third investigation 
is that not all traces of Husserl's earlier psychological approach and in-
terests have been expunged. This affects both the language within which 
Husserl makes his points, and the range of examples to which he gen-
erally makes recourse. Thus the word 'content' is frequently used where 
the word 'object' is also appropriate, and where the latter ought to be 
used in preference. This is despite Husserl's acceptance that his remarks 
hold for all objects generally, and not just psychological contents. The 
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examples are drawn almost exclusively from the phenomenological 
psychology of perception ~ for instance, that in the visual perception of a 
coloured thing, the moment of colour and the moment of spatial exten-
sion are both dependent parts of the thing as a whole, and require each 
other's co-occurrence in the thing. When this observation is transposed 
from the phenomenological to the ontological mode, this yields the 
proposition that the moment of colour and moment of extension of the 
thing itself (rather than the thing as perceived) are dependent parts of it. 
In this case the transposition seems to go quite smoothly, and I believe 
that it was Husserl's opinion that this would be so quite generally: for 
'content' substitute 'object' and the theory has been in principle ex-
tended. It seems to me questionable whether the extension of the theory 
to objects in general is in fact so easy. Particular attention must be paid 
to the fact that some objects at least may belong to more than one kind at 
once, and that its dependence relations vis-a-vis other objects may vary 
according to the kind. This consideration is lacking from the psycholog-
ical case, and so may have been at work in moulding Husserl's thoughts 
about the general properties ofthe more important part-whole relations. 
It is often difficult to tell, at crucial junctures in the text, whether the un-
thematised background of examples was playing a part, and if so, what 
part. 15 
Arising from this is the fact that it is in general possible to give the con-
cepts of dependence and independence a much wider application out-
side the theory of whole and part. Husserl may not have been unaware 
of this, but he does not embark on any such general development. I have 
therefore allowed myself to go beyond the range of Husserl's examples 
in order to open up the question of such a generalised theory of depen-
dence. The attendant risks of distortion and misrepresentation of Hus-
serl's own position are I believe worth running if we are to put his ideas 
to work quite generally. 
§ 2 Problems of Formalisation 
There is a wide range of formal languages among which to choose when 
we attempt to formalise Hussert's ideas. Choice among these must be 
motivated by considerations partly external to whole-part theory as 
such. But whichever language is chosen, it cannot, if it is to do justice to 
H usserl's ideas, be extensional. The whole-part theories of Lesniewski 
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on the one hand and Leonard and Goodman on the other are both ex-
tensional. So a minimalist solution to the choice problem would be to 
add to one of these a necessity operator and axioms for it. One could for 
instance take the axioms and rules of S4 and graft these on to the 
Leonard-Goodman calculus of individuals. This approach has all the 
merits of timidity: it causes least disturbance. But there are drawbacks 
as well. Since Husserl was writing before it was appreciated how modal 
logic would proliferate different systems, there is no chance of receiving 
a direct answer from his writings as to which of the many available 
would be the best to choose. In view however of formula (3) below, 
which tells us that whenever species stand in a relation of foundation 
they do so of necessity, it appears that any modal system used would 
have to contain the characteristic S4 axiom 0 p:J 0 0 p as a the-
orem. One obvious candidate modal system is accordingly S4. How-
ever, since the applications of modal considerations in the present con-
text do not seem to require that we decide among alternatives whose dif-
ferences do not show up in the sorts of formula we shall be considering, I 
shall in fact shirk the choice, and suggest merely that the modal axioms 
be not weaker than S4. 
There is a problem about using a propositional necessity operator at 
all, in that traditionally the term 'essence' has related not to propositions 
but to properties, to de re rather than de dicto necessity. Husserl's writ-
ings show a willingness to accept both that individuals of certain kinds 
possess essential properties, and that there are general essences or eide. 
which are the abstract objects of imaginative variation among possibili-
ties. For this reason I suggest that in addition to a necessity operator on 
propositions it is advantageous to consider a necessity operator on pred-
icates, or property-abstracts. I shall use the expression 'nec' for this pur-
pose. The operator was introduced by David Wiggins,16 who has given 
strong reasons, independent of Husserlian considerations, for believing 
that such an operator is indispensable to our ordinary conceptual 
scheme. It remains to be seen how 'nec' and' 0 ' should be taken to inter-
act, indeed whether a unified theory of them is possible at all. Because of 
these uncertainties, the account given in this paper must be regarded as 
only a tentative investigation into essentialistic whole-part theory. 
There is yet a further reason for disquiet over simply grafting modal 
operators onto extensional mereology. For in extensional mereology 
(which I take to comprise both Lesniewski's mereology and the 
Leonard-Goodman calculus of individuals) a thing is identified with the 
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sum of its parts; indeed Goodman defines the identity of things as con-
sisting in their having the same parts. But this rules out in advance the 
possibility of different things merely coinciding spatio-temporally. The 
case where such coincidence does not extend throughout the total life-
span of both things is usually handled within extensional mereology by 
reconstruing things as four-dimensional space-time worms, and poin-
ting out that temporary coincidence merely involves two such entities 
overlapping in a certain spatio-temporal region. However, there may al-
so be cases in which we should wish to say that two things coincided over 
their total life-span, yet were not identical. This is connected with the 
fact that according to the everyday notion of a material thing, a thing can 
both gain and lose parts without prejudice to its identity, as can, most 
obviously, an organism. 17 But a whole which conforms to the sum-
principle of extensional mereology cannot lose any part. One way of 
avoiding recourse to four-dimensional objects, but which preserves the 
sum-principle, is Roderick Chisholm's theory of entia successiva. 18 
However, it seems somewhat drastic to abandon the paradigmatic role 
of organisms among material individuals for the sake of an abstract 
principle, when the normal three-dimensional thing-concept has not 
conclusively been shown to be beyond redemption. It would further be 
premature to abandon the normal conception in expounding Husserl's 
whole-part theory, if there is, as I believe, a chance that this very theory 
could provide assistance in explicating the normal conception of a 
thing.l'i 
So I shall not be following a minimalist line: our mereology will not 
have the principle that coincident things are identical, and we shall use a 
de re necessity operator. It follows that the suggestions contained in this 
paper are largely exploratory: like Husserl's this is not a formal presen-
tation with axioms and theorems, but an attempt to set out some of the 
possibilities and clarify some of the issues which need to be resolved be-
fore a formalisation of Husserl's ideas which is both intuitively and for-
mally adequate can be presented. 
One respect in which Husserl's whole-part theory is distinctive is its 
essential use of what Husserl calls pure species. I shall use lower-case 
Greek letters a, fj etc. for such species, and lower-case Italic letters a, b, 
c, etc. for arbitrary members of a, f-3, y respectively. Where we are treat-
ing an individual as such, in abstraction, as far as possible, from consid-
erations of which species it belongs to, I shall use the letters s, t. Expres-
sions of the f orin' s E ex' will mean • s belongs to the species ex'. But there 
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is here a problem of interpretation. What are such species? Do they in-
deed exist? If we follow H usserl in assuming that they do, we run the risk 
of building too many ontological presuppositions into the formalisation 
in advance. I shall accordingly give expressions of the form's E a.' as far 
as possible a merely syntactic reading, allowing 'a.' to replace a common 
noun, and reading it as's is an a.'. This leaves it open until later whether 
we should treat (1. as a proper name of a pure species, or of a set, or mere-
ly as a common name for s and maybe various other individuals. One 
thing to note, however, if we are to remain faithful to Husserl's way of 
construing species, is that we cannot allow contradictory species. Every 
species is, for Husserl, such that it could have members, even if it in fact 
does not. We shall accordingly make the informal stipulation that sub-
stituends for a., fJ etc. should be such that '0 (3 x) (x E (1.)' should be 
true.20 
Husserl explicitly warns the reader that he is using the term 'part' in a 
wider sense than it is usually given. He wishes it to comprise not only de-
tachable pieces but also anything else discernible in an object, anything 
that is an actual constituent of it, apart from relational characteristics. 2 1 
In Aristotelian terminology, Husserl's parts would comprise parts nor-
mally so-called, accidents, and also boundaries. 22 Doubts about the pro-
priety of such a treatment are expressed by Findlay in the introduction 
to his English translation of the Logical Investigations. Findlay suggests 
that while there may be analogies between parts in the usual sense and 
individual accidents or moments, the two do not belong to the same 
category and it is therefore a mistake to treat them together ontological-
ly. This does not recognise the expressly formal nature of Husserl's the-
ory, for it is precisely the independence of restrictions to any particular 
category or region which mark what Husserl calls a formal theory. Hus-
serl's account proceeds independently of doctrines concerning catego-
ries and category-mistakes.23 The only way in which Husserl could be, in 
his own terms, mistaken, would be if he had confused either two formal 
concepts, or one formal concept and one material. Given only that Hus-
serl does believe in individual accidents or property-instances, he can-
not but treat them as falling within the formal concept of part. It is true 
that many philosophers have disputed whether there are such accidents. 
In answer it can be pointed out that not all the examples Husserl ad-
duces as moments are property-instances; there are also boundaries, al-
though he did not expressly include the latter until the later work Experi-
ence and Judgment.24 It would be uncharitable to expect Husserl to pro-
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duce a justification for treating of moments along with other parts in 
advance of judging how well the theory so produced managed to solve 
problems of unity and predication by comparison with other competing 
theories. 
§ 3 Husserl's Basic Concepts: Whole and Foundation 
The two most important concepts employed by Hussed in the third in-
vestigation are those of whole and foundation. Unfortunately, both 
these terms are ambiguous, and we must recognise their various senses 
before we can make clear sense of H ussed' s theory. By contrast, Hussed 
does not make thematic the marks of the general concept part as such, 
but proceeds rather to make distinctions among the various kinds of 
part. It must be assumed that he considers the concept too primitive, be-
ing a formal concept, to allow of substantive elucidation. 
Hussed distinguishes three different concepts of whole, a narrow 
concept, a wide concept, and a pregnant concept. The first two terms are 
mine; the last is Husserls's own. It is characteristic of Hussed's ap-
proach in the Investigations that he is reluctant to coin special terminol-
ogy, even where he recognises ambiguities and is attempting to avoid 
them. This is in contrast to his later Willingness to develop a specifically 
phenomenological vocabulary. 
A narrow whole is one in which a number of entities are bound to-
gether into a unit by a further entity which Husserl calls a 'unifying mo-
ment' (Einheitsmoment). Narrow wholes are a rather special kind of 
whole, and cannot comprise all the wholes that there are. The supposi-
tion that all wholes are narrow in this sense leads, as Husserl points out 
in a passage reminiscent of Bradley,25 to every complex being, appear-
ances notwithstanding, infinitely complex. For if A and B are bound to-
gether by U, then A and U must be bound together by UI, and so on ad 
infinitum. Husserl's own theory offers a way out of this regress of parts, 
by suggesting that some kinds of entity come together to form wholes 
just because they are the kinds of entity that they are, and thereby re-
quire partners, without requiring anything else which joins them togeth-
er.26 
The wide concept of whole seems to me to be very like Goodman's 
concept of an individual; no restrictions are placed on how tightly or 
loosely connected the various parts of the whole are, whether they are 
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scattered or not, so long as we can still regard the whole as a single thing. 
It is indeed in the possibility of being regarded as a single thing that Hus-
serl considers that bare unity consists.27 This does not mean however 
that there are only individuals. Husserl expressly contrasts uni~y and 
plurality as fonnal concepts.28 But any plurality may be taken together 
as something unitary, thereby founding a new higher unity, whose unity 
is, however, extrinsic to it, in the collective act.29 So I shall allow as indi-
viduals anything which can possess a (singular) proper name. This will 
include even arbitrary collectiva. This liberality is reflected in extension~ 
al mereologies by allowing that arbitrary sums of individuals are them-
selves individuals. The reason for this is not that we wish to take most of 
these arbitrary collectiva seriously, but rather that it is not clear in ad-
vance where to draw the line between things which are wholes in this 
widest and weakest sense, and those which have some more intrinsic 
unity.30 
The third or pregnant concept of whole is defined by H usserl in tenns 
of the concept of foundation. A pregnant whole is one each of whose 
parts is foundationally connected, directly or indirectly, with every 
other, and no part of the whole so fonned is founded on anything else 
outside the whole. This of course presupposes Husserl's own concept of 
foundation, which means that Husserl attempts to define one sense of 
whole in tenns of foundation, which in fact itself presupposes another 
concept of whole, the wide concept, which is, as Hussed points out, not 
a real or detennining predicate. 31 The unity of a pregnant whole is intrin-
sic to it, by contrast with the extrinsic unity of a mere sum or aggregate. 
When we turn to foundation, matters are not so clear. It is most im-
portant to clarify Husserl's meaning here, since the concept of founda-
tion turns out to be the most basic one of the whole investigation. I be-
lieve that we must distinguish two very different types of relation, both 
of which Husserl calls 'foundation'. There is a generic concept, which 
relates species, and there is an individual concept. which relates individ-
uals which belong to species related according to the generic relation. It 
would in fact be more correct to speak of generic and individual con-
cepts in the plural, since Hussed offers several fonnulations which do 
not exactly coincide, and it is possible to discern further definitional 
possibilities not considered by Husserl. It is chiefly in connection with 
the generic relations that one can speak, as Hussed does, of laws of es-
sence. Husserl is mainly interested in the essential relations, and so does 
not offer an account of individual relations as such. But if one is to be 
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able to discuss the foundational relations of determinate individuals, 
such an account is needed, and there are crucial places in the investiga-
tion where Husserl is clearly talking about relations between determi-
nate individuals, albeit individuals considered as belonging to a certain 
species. In his official introduction of the concept of foundation, Hus-
serl, in addition to speaking of the case where the species r:J. and f3 are 
foundationally related, also mentions the case where we should say that 
two members a and bofthese respective species are themselves founda-
tionally related.32 The definition of relative dependence and indepen-
dence offered earlier speaks clearly of one thing's being dependent or 
independent relative to another.33 In each case it is clear from either the 
context or the notation that the schematic letters used by Husserl are to 
be taken as singular terms.34 Finally the notion of a pregnant whole re-
quires that we talk about the foundational connectedness of the individ-
ual parts making up the whole. For these reasons an account of the foun-
dational relatedriess of individuals is necessary. However, Husserl was 
of the opinion that it is possible to move back and forth between talk 
about individuals and talk about species without difficulty, and so does 
not enlarge upon the difference.35 It is however this difference which 
constitutes the major difficulty in developing a Husserlian whole-part 
theory. 
Husserl defines foundation in the first instance as a relation holding 
between two pure species. The verbal rendering of the definition goes 
thus :36 
an r:J. as such requires 
foundation by a f3 
there is an essential law to the effect 
- that an r:J. cannot exist as such except 
in a more comprehensive unity which 
associates it with a f3. 
Later Husserl contends that the concept of whole or unity here employ-
ed is dispensable, and reformulates what he takes to be the same idea 
thus :37 in virtue of the essential nature of an r:J., an r:J. cannot exist as such 
unless a f3 also exists. 
In this second version reference to a more comprehensive whole is 
missing. But this suffices to make the two concepts of foundation not 
equivalent. For according to the second definition, every species is self-
founding. This means that, according to a statement Husserl elsewhere 
makes about absolute dependence,38 everything is dependent absolute-
ly. This is clearly not what Husserl wanted since it obliterates the distinc-
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tion between dependent and independent objects. So the concept of 
foundation used in defining absolute and relative dependence cannot 
be the weaker second concept. One solution to this problem which read-
ily suggests itself is that the species ex and {1 have to be different; We 
could then say that something is dependent only if it is dependent on 
something belonging to another species.39 This will not do, however, 
since it turns out that there are species which are non-trivially self-
founding, which the suggestion does not allow. 
So we shall revert to Husserl's first formulation, with its reference to a 
more comprehensive unity. This suggests that every ex should be found 
together with a (1 in something of which the a in question is a proper 
part. In what follows, we shall use Goodman's symbols' <' for 'is a 
proper part of and' < ' for 'is a part of, where the latter allows, while the 
former excludes, coincidence. Hence our suggestion for a rendering of 
the definition is: 
(1) O(Vx) (x£ a :::> (3yz) (y£ ~ & x < z& y < z) 
This condition appears still not to be strong enough. Whilst it captures 
the letter of Hussed's formulation it misses something of the spirit, in 
that in line with this definition the more comprehensive whole could be 
simply the ~ itself. This appears implausible as capturing the idea that 
we want: while we might say that the species husband is founded on that 
of wife (and vice versa of course) we should not want to say that because 
the existence of husbands required that of married couples that hus-
bands are founded as such on married couples. This appears to have got 
marital carts before horses. Similar remarks would apply, mutatis mu-
tandis, to foundation relations cited by Hussed, such as the mutual 
foundedness of colour-moments and moments of extension. Husserl 
takes foundation to be a relation of necessary association,40 and the con-
notations of this word preclude either the a or the ~ in question from ex-
hausting the more comprehensive whole of which each is a part. Indeed 
Husserl's formulation is itself ambiguous in that it could be read as im-
plying that the whole is more comprehensive just than the a or as more 
comprehensive than both the ex and the {1, which is our second and pre-
ferred reading. Although Husserl does talk of wholes in the pregnant 
sense being founded upon the range of their parts: l this is a regrettable 
equivocation, and probably stems from the etymology and previous use 
by others as well as Hussed of the word. In the sense we have formulat-
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ed, everything which is founded on something is thereby dependent, 
whereas in this other sense we could describe even independent wholes 
as founded upon their parts. It would be better to describe such wholes 
as constituted by their parts, reserving the word 'foundation', despite its 
misleading etymology, for the associative relationship. However, we 
cannot merely strengthen the last conjunct 'y < z of (I) to 'y -< z', for it 
would follow from this that any species whose instances had to exist as 
part of some greater whole would thereby be a self-founding species. 
But while a lake cannot exist as such unless surrounded by land, and a 
child cannot exist as such unles it has parents, this cannot be regarded as 
making the species lake and child self-founding, whereas the species si-
bling clearly is self-founding, since a sibling cannot as such exist unless 
another sibling exists. So, using 'a I W for 'a s are founded on ~ s' we 
arrive at the following definition of generic foundation: 
(2) a I ~: = 0 ('V x) (x EO.:::> (3 y) (y E ~ & x 4. y & y 4. x» 
where 'x 4. y' abbreviates' -- (x < y)'. 
The essential nature of the foundation relation is expressed by the 
prefixed necessity operator. Since we have assumed the availability of 
the S4 principle 0 p :::> 0 0 p, we have as a consequence that all generic 
foundation relationships hold of necessity: 
(3) (a I ~) :::> 0 (a I ~) 
a result which would meet with Husserl's approval. It might be ques-
tioned, however, whether strict implication adequately fits the bill for 
expressing the relationship between as and ~s that we are aiming for. 
Should it perhaps involve some relationship of logical relevance, con-
necting the two species? For instance, would it be better to adopt the fol-
lowing as a definition of foundation: 
(4) ( 'V x) (x E a -- ( 3y) (y E ~ & x 4. y & y 4. x» 
where the arrow represents the entailment connective?42 This would ap-
pear to be in harmony with Husserl's view of the relationship as arising 
out of the very nature of as as such. It would preserve the theorem (3) 
above, since the logical system E of entailment has an S4 modal struc-
ture. And suppose that it is necessarily false that there be an a: would 
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not definition (2) make it trivially true that a I ~ for all species ~? This 
would also appear to favour an approach via entailment. But we have 
stipulated informally that no such case can arise, because it would vio-
late the requirement that every species be such as to be capable of having 
instances, so this problem cannot arise as long as we remain within the lim-
its imposed by this stipulation. While it would seem both possible and 
perhaps in the long run desirable to develop a foundation theory in 
terms of entailment or some other relevant connective, this course 
places additional difficulties in the path of interpreting Hussed, and so 
will not be followed here. 
While the definition of foundation given above as (2) includes many 
important essential part-whole relationships, it does not include them 
all, so it is worth noting that the wider sense of foundation given by Hus-
serl can be captured as follows: 
(5) a "+ ~ : = 0 ('v' x) (x £ a :> (3y) (y£ ~») 
It is in this sense, rather than that of (2), that a whole which needs a part 
of a certain kind may be said to be founded on that part. For instance, it 
is essential to men that they possess brains, or tables that they possess 
tops. Such essential parts cannot however be described as being asso-
ciated with the wholes which include them, since associated parts are 
co-ordinated, neither being the whole itself. It may be because Hussed 
was not quite clear which of the various possible essentialistic relations 
he wished to describe as foundation that we get from him more than one, 
non-equivalent definition. It is more to the point, however, simply to 
note the differences, remarking that both concepts of foundation have 
their uses. We shall in what follows concentrate predominantly on 'I', 
since this appears to carry the greater weight for Husserl. However, as 
we shall see, some of the results which Husserl takes to hold for founda-
tion in general hold for'"+ 'but not for' I'. 
As an application of our definitions let us consider one of the proposi-
tions put forward by Hussed in § 14 of the Investigation, and for which 
he offers informal proofs. This is Husserl's Theorem 143 : 
If an a as such requires to be founded on a ~, every whole having an a, but not a 
~, as a part, requires a similar foundation. 
To represent this we introduce by definition a complex general term 
'a)W, to be read 'object which contains an a but not a ~ as part'. Defini-
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tions of general terms take the form of showmg what condition an indi-
vidual must satisfy to fall underthe term, and accordingly have the form 
. t E CC = ( ... t ... f, where 't' is an arbitarary singular term and 
'( .. . 1 ... r stands for a sentential context containing occurrences of' t' 
hut not of ' a . or any other term defined in terms of , a' . Thus we give a de-
finition of 'n)W as follows: 
(6) t E u)B : = (3x) (x E (( & x < t) & - (3x) (x E I) & x < t) 
It is understood that if an open sentence of the form 'x b <x)!f occurs in a 
proof. that when replaced by an open sentence corresponding to the 
right-hand side of the definition (6). we reletter hound variables ifneces .. 
"ary so as to ensure that scope problems do not arise: otherwise the use 
of open sentences containing defined general terms is the same as that 
when there are no bound variables present. 
Given (2) and (6) it is a simple matter of modal predicate logic, using 
only the transitivity property of' <' to prove 
and its necessity, which is tht~ obvious way of representing Hussert's 
Theorem 1.44 Thus what Husserl confidently calls its axiomatic self-evi-
dence is seen to stand up in the present formalisation. 
While the relation' 1- ' is trivially reflexive. the relation' I' is not. 
Only certain species are self-founding in the stronger sense. The most 
obvious examples are those lIsing derelativised nouns. These do not fi-
gure as such in Husserl's examples, although his exposition uses such 
nouns a good deal. We can offer the following as examples: sibling, 
spouse, partner, colleague, cousin. accomplice. companion, fellow, 
enemy, peer, assocIate. The last example uses the very idea Husserl em-
ploys to characterise the foundational tie as sllch. We might offer exam-
ples of non-self-founding species such as house, mountain, planet. 
A crude grammatical test for whether a noun corresponds to a 
founded species or not is to see whether it is natural to describe an (I.. as, 
say, an n (?lsomething or someone. So every colour is the colour of 
~omething, every spouse is the spouse of someone, every planet is the 
planet of some star, every monarch is the monarch of some realm, and so 
on. The test is only crude, however, in that some founded species are not 
so spoken of, e.g. we do not call a lake or an island a lake (?lthe sur-
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rounding land, or island of the surrounding sea, and the word 'of can 
mean many other things. Nevertheless the test is a useful rough guide. 
For self-founding species, for instance, it often makes sense to say that 
every a is an (or the) a of another a. 
Some foundation relations between species are symmetric; Husserl 
calls such relations two-sided or mutualfoundation.45 For example the 
species husband and wife, or colour and extension, are mutually found-
ing.46 On the other hand, some foundation relations are not symmetric; 
these are one-sided. Thus in Brentano's psychology judgments are one-
sidedly founded on presentations or ideas, while feelings of love and 
hate are founded on judgments, again one-sidedly, and hence indirectly 
on ideas. To take our geographical example again, a lake is as such one-
sidedly founded on dry land. Several terms from physical geography 
show such one-sided foundation, e.g. mountain, plateau, cwm, island, 
peninsula, and so on. 
Whereas • "+ ' is transitive, • I ' is not. The definition (2) has to be ex-
amined to see why not. The conditions a I ~ and ~ I Y do not suffice to 
show that a I y, because if we have a € a, b € ~ and c € y satisfying the 
conditions for (2), the fact that neither a and b nor band c are part of 
one another does not suffice to show that a cannot have c as part or vice 
versa. Examples of this are hard to come by, but the following suggests 
itself: there cannot be a person conducting the defence at a trial unless 
there is a trial, and there cannot be a trial unless there is a defendant or 
defendants. But there is nothing to stop the or a defendant conducting 
the defence at the trial. Another consideration which reinforces the posi-
tion that • I ' be not transitive is that if it were, all species two-sidedly 
founded on some other species, would by transitivity and symmetry be 
self-founding, in the strong sense, and this is surely not intended. 
It is possible to define certain more general concepts relating to 
foundation if we allow ourselves to quantify over species, introducing 
bound general term variables. We may say that a species is founded or is 
founding according as there is a species it is founded upon or, respec-
tively, founds: 
(8) a I : = ( 3~)( a I ~) 
(9) 10.: = (3~)(~la) 
Here we use a notational device which we find convenient elsewhere al-
so: to represent existential generalisation by omission. We can also de-
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fine an important concept of essential independence for species: as as 
such are essentially independent when they are not founded: 
(10) I(a): = -- (a I) 
The other important concept of foundation concerns not the relations 
between species but those between individuals. Husserl, as we men-
tioned, brushes very lightly over the distinction, and in the 1929 com-
mentary on the formal work in the third investigation by Eugenie Gins-
berg, whose later article appears in this volume in translation, the dis-
tinction goes quite unnoticed.47 If we are to be able to speak of founda-
tional relationships between individuals at all, we cannot rest content 
with defining such individual foundation in terms of generic founda-
tion, after a fashion such as this: a, as an a, is founded on b as a ~ : = a £ 
a & b £ ~ & a I ~. The first and most obvious reason is that just be-
cause a £ a and b £ ~ and a I ~ it does not follow that a is founded on 
b. For b must be not just any ~ but the right one. If Alice, as a wife, is 
founded on Bob, as a husband, it is not sufficient that Alice be a wife and 
Bob a husband: they must be married to one another. Similarly, al-
though, to use Husserl's example again, a moment of colouredness re-
quires a moment of extension and vice versa, merely taking the colour-
moment of one thing and the extension-moment of another does not 
yield the more independent colour-extension whole required. 
A definition of individual in terms of generic foundation would be 
forthcoming were we able to specify a condition F( a,b,a,~) to be added 
as a conjunct to the right-hand side of the attempted definition above. I 
have been unable to find such a general condition, and indeed have 
come to believe, somewhat reluctantly, that there is none to be found. 
We can certainly find formulae for many particular cases: for example 
in the marital case we simply need the relation' a is married to b'. But it is 
clear that in this case the species terms are derived from the relative by 
derelativisation. Furthermore, if Husserl is correct in saying that the 
foundational relations between species rest on the essential natures of 
the species in question, and not on formal considerations, we ought not 
to be able to find such a general formula. 
One initially promising way of trying to define individual foundation 
from generic is to introduce different concepts of whole. For the whole 
formed by the colour of this + the extension of that is a mere whole, in 
the widest sense mentioned above, whereas the whole formed by the co-
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lour of this + the extension of this is much more coherent. This coher-
ence cannot consist in total independence however, since both the co-
lour and extension may (and in this case do) require completion by 
something beyond them. Nor can it mean simply completability, since 
the colour of this + the extension of that can also be completed into a 
self-sufficient whole, namely this + that. Similarly, while Mr. Smith 
and Mrs. Jones do not form a maritally self-sufficient whole, together 
with Mrs. Smith and Mr. Jones they do, namely a pair of married cou-
ples. This sort of completion results in a whole which is in a certain sense 
too large, giving us the sum of two of the sort of whole we were looking 
for. So the whole resulting from completion must be specified more 
closely. It would seem that the best way to do this is to invoke the con-
cept of a pregnant whole. The colour of this + the extension of this is 
part of a self-sufficient visual datum, say, which is not merely summed 
aggregatively with another. Similarly a single married couple is the 
smallest maritally independent whole; every member of the collection is 
maritally connected to every other, whereas in a pair of couples each 
member of a couple is maritally unconnected with the members of the 
other couple. The pregnant whole for the foundation relation in ques-
tion offers the promise of being neither too large nor too small. But this 
concept is itself defined in terms of the relation of individual founda-
tion, as we shall see below, so it cannot be invoked without circularity. I 
do not believe that Husserl saw the threat of circularity here, so it is not 
to be expected that we could find from his account any indication as to 
how it might be avoided. 
Another suggestion would be that two foundationally related items 
can only be found together in one substance. This would mean restrict-
ing the examples of foundation relations unduly, since a planet would 
normally be regarded as a substance, yet planets as such cannot exist 
unless stars exist, for example. The suggestion is quite foreign to the 
spirit of Husserl's enterprise, for Husserl never speaks of substances. It 
would I think have been much more to his liking to work towards a de-
finition or definitions of substance through his theory rather than the 
other way around. This is not to say that we cannot use the notion of sub-
stance to guide our investigation in various directions, merely that the 
general problem of individual foundation is not to be resolved by re-
course to the notion. It accordingly seems best that we treat the concept 
of individual foundation as primitive. 
That a particular a cannot exist without a ~ may be true: that it cannot 
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exist without the particular ~ which satisfies this requirement need not 
also be true: for Bob to be a husband he must be married, but he need not 
be married to Alice; he might have married Carol instead. So at the level 
of individual foundation a measure of unavoidable factuality enters in, 
though not to all relations of individual foundation. 
One of the general problems facing a theory of individual foundation 
is the question as to how far we may be taking Husserl to be working 
within assumptions about logical form which are implicitly Aristotelian, 
and whether such assumptions must be rejected. This concerns in parti-
cular the question whether an individual may be an instance of different 
species such that its foundational relations to other individuals vary ac-
cording to the species in question. For instance, Jupiter falls into the spe-
cies planet and also heaven~v body. Qua planet, Jupiter is foundational-
ly related to the Sun, the substantive relation in this case being gravita-
tional. But qua heavenly body, Jupiter is not founded on the Sun. lbe 
problem is that if we are to say, as Husserl appears to want to, that a giv-
en individual either is or is not founded on another individual, we have 
to either deny that an individual can belong to two co-ordinate species, 
or else insist that there is some one privileged species with respect to 
which all talk about foundational relatedness of an individual is to be 
carried on. clbis sort of supposition can be roughly characterised as Aris-
totelian, and there are indications of such a position in Husser1.48 An ob-
vious candidate for such a privileged species is an individual's i/~fima 
species, the product species of all those to which it belongs, which 
would, on Husserl's view, have only that individual as extension. It 
would be what he calls an eidetic singularitv.49 The problem with this is 
that in order for such a species to guarantee individuation of the object 
in question it would, pace Leibniz, have to comprise relational charac-
teristics. This is not in itself objectionable, since many of the clearest 
cases offoundation rest on relations. But again the contingency of many 
of the relationships into which a thing enters means that we should have 
to find a way to distinguish essential from accidental attributes of some-
thing in order to arrive at a stable and useful conception of individuals' 
relative dependence and independence. Also an infima .\pecies will al-
most certainly have an infinite intension, so it could not be a working 
tool for the investigation of individual foundation. To take this problem 
into account, we shall have to mark explicitly the species under which 
we are considering an individual's foundedness. 
The mdividual foundational relations hold between individuals not 
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merely as such, then, but considered as belonging to given species. The 
only way in which this consideration can be excluded from explicit men-
tion is either by general ising, or by assuming that for certain individuals 
there are species to which they could not but belong in order for them to 
exist at all, in other words to assume essentialism for individuals. We 
shall explore both possibilities. 
The basic relation of individual foundation we can accordingly gloss, 
in full dress, as's, qua a, is founded on 1, qua W. We shall symbolise this 
as 's~ ~ t'. The similarity of basic symbol is intentional, but note that it is 
flanked by singular rather than general terms, and is indexed by a pair of 
general terms. We must take care to distinguish this formulation from 
the similar sounding's, which is an a, is founded on 1, which is a W. The 
latter, while mentioning the species to which sand 1 belong, does not, 
like the former, say that it is in virtue of belonging to these species that 
they are so related. If we take's is founded on l' as merely meaning that 
sand 1 belong to some species whereby they are so related (cf. (20) be-
low) then the latter form may be true while the former is false: e. g., it is 
true that Jupiter is a heavenly body, and is founded on the Sun, which is 
also a heavenly body, but it is not in virtue of Jupiter's being a heavenly 
body that it is founded on the Sun, but rather in virtue of its being a plan-
et of the Sun. 
Expressions like 'as such', 'qua', 'in virtue of being' ,and others repea-
tedly used by Husserl and by ourselves in discussing foundation, are 
logically peculiar in that they do not form unrestrictive relative clauses 
as 'which', 'that' etc. do, but create an intensional context. To see this, let 
us take a pair of examples. Suppose the owner of the Casa Negra night-
club is also the husband of Dolores, its principal singer. Then while the 
following are true: 
(a) The owner of the Casa Negra cannot exist as such unless the Casa 
Negra exists. 
(b) The husband of Dolores cannot exist as such unless Dolores exists. 
The sentences obtained by interchanging subjects of (a) and (b) are 
false. Similarly, supposing that all and only rational animals are feather-
less bipeds, it does not follow that 
( c) A rational animal as such (by nature) has two legs. 
or that 
(d) Jones, qua rational animal, has two legs. 
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It follows that there is no such entity as Jones qua rational animal, which 
is to be distinguished from Jones qua loving father, for instance. Expres-
sions like 'Jones qua loving father' are not genuine singular terms, but 
sentential fragments having the force e. g. of 'Jones is a loving father, 
and as such, he ... ' where the 'as such' creates the intensional context. 50 
This property of 'as such' and related expressions throws into relief the 
difficulties about the connection between generic and individual foun-
dation. To the extent that we have either to mention or otherwise as-
sume, with expressions like' qua' or 'as such', a general kind or species, 
Husserl is right in taking individuals to stand in foundational relations 
in virtue oftheir belonging to species which stand in generic foundation-
al relations. 51 
We can give a specification of the connection between generic and in-
dividual foundation by the following axioms: 
(11) O(sJ~t~ (s£a&t£~&a-'~&s-i t&t-i s» 
(12) D(a-'~ ~ (\fx)(x£a::J (3y)(x;1~y») 
The converse implication to that given in (12) follows from (11) together 
with the definition (2) of generic foundation. This gives us the desirable 
result that as as such are founded on ~s if and only if any a is as such 
founded on some ~ as such. The appearance of triviality of this result 
disappears when it is remarked that 'founded on' does not mean the 
same in both occurrences. The indefinability of the individual relation 
in terms of the generic amounts to the lack of a general formula 
F (s,t,a,~) which could be added as a conjunct on the right of the impli-
cation in (11) so as to turn it into an equivalence. 
§ 4 Dependence 
Having dealt at length with the problems of foundation, we should now 
turn to the more general concepts of dependence and independence, 
which will of course vary according to the conception of foundation by 
means of which they are defined. Given the definition of foundedness 
(8) and essential independence (I 0) for species, we can define related 
notions of dependence and independence for individuals: an individual 
is partly dependent, written 'dep', when some species it belongs to is 
founded: 
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(13) dep(s):= (3~)(SE~&~-') 
while an individual is totally independent, written 'ind', when it is not 
partly dependent, that is: 
(14) ind(s): = ( V~)(SE~ :> I(~» 
One could similarly define partial independence and total dependence. 
It follows from (11), (12) and (14) that an individual is totally independ-
ent if and only if it is not founded in any way on any other individual. It 
should be noted that by definition no individual can be self-founding, 
since every individual is a part (albeit improper) of itself. By contrast, 
some species are, as we have seen, self-founding. 
The condition of total independence is extraordinarily strong, be-
cause of the universal quantification. It might be wondered what, if any-
thing, could satisfy it. Since, according to orthodox cosmology, God 
falls under the term 'creator', and there can be no creator without crea-
tures, even God would not, according to this view, be totally independ-
ent, being reciprocally founded on his works. 
Because of the strength and uncertainty of application of such condi-
tions, it would appear advantageous to develop more readily applicable 
conditions. One way to do this is to attempt to distinguish in individuals 
those species to which they belong of necessity from those to which they 
belong adventitiously. It is here that we shall use Wiggins' de re opera-
tor 'nee'. This will be used to offer a faithful formal rendering of such ex-
pressions as 'smust be an a', 's is essentially/necessarily/by its very na-
ture an a'. This would normally be written, using property-abstraction, 
as 
[ nee (Ax)(X E a)] (s); 
however, to avoid unnecessary symbolic complication, I shall adopt the 
abbreviation 
s! E a 
and in general, for any simpiepredicate, where there is no risk of confu-
sion, de renecessity will be marked by an exclamation mark after the oc-
currences of terms of which the predicate holds of necessity; so's! < t!' 
will be short for [ nec (Ax)(AY)(X < y)] (s,t) and so on. 
134 
We may now define an individual as being essentially independent, 
written 4 essind', when every species to which it belongs of necessity is in-
dependent: 
(15) essind(s):= (V'~)(S!E~ :::> I(~» 
while an individual is essentially dependent when it is not essentially in-
dependent: 
(16) essdep(s): = ( 3~)(s! E ~ & ~I) 
Armed with these new concepts we may resolve the theological problem 
about God's dependence on the world, in a manner suggested by Aqui-
nas,52 by noting that since God need not have created the world, his be-
ing a creator is not essential to him, so he can be secured essential inde-
pendence. The world, on the other hand, is essentially dependent, at 
least according to the traditional cosmology. The only possible candi-
date for total independence on such a view would be the totality com-
prising both God and the world. 
According to traditional theology, the world is dependent on God 
both because he created it and because he continuously sustains it. The 
Husserlian concept of dependence covers both kinds of dependence, 
because it makes no reference to time. So something which needs to be 
produced by something else, but which can thereafter survive without 
this, is dependent on it in a different way from that in which something is 
dependent on something which it requires to exist at every time at which 
it exists itself. It is worthwhile contrasting the views of Husserl on de-
pendence with those of his student Ingarden. In his chief work, Der 
Streit um die Exislenz der Welt, Ingarden distinguishes four basic 
senses of dependence/independence.51 Since these are given in oppos-
ing pairs, we need only characterise one of each pair. They may be set 








_ Dependence. 54 
An object is autonomous or self-existent if it has its existential founda-
tion in itself, is immanently determined.55 An object is original if, in its 
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essence, it cannot be produced by any other object. 56 An object is self-
sufficient if it does not need, by virtue of its essence, to coexist with 
something else within a single whole. 57 Finally, an object which is self-
sufficient is independent if it does not require, by virtue of its essence, 
the existence of any other object which is also self-sufficient. 5R I ngarden 
draws attention to Husserl's examination of dependence and indepen-· 
dence in the third investigation, but regards the eight concepts he sets 
out as belonging to a kind of theory which Husserl did not recognise, 
which I ngarden calls exio;;tential ontology, and which he contrasts with 
both formal and material ontology. There are considerable differences 
of background between Husserl's and Ingarden's respective treatments 
of dependence and independence, which we cannot enter into here. It is 
clear however that Ingarden's distinctions (2)-( 4) could be variously in-
terpreted within Husserl's theory offoundation. Ingarden in particular 
models his (3) on Husserl's definition offoundation. The difference be-
tween (3) and (4) is not highlighted by Husserl, and in making it Ingar-
den must have in mind some concept of whole stronger than the wide 
concept employed by Husser!' The only one of Ingarden's pairs which 
does not obviously fall within the general Husserlian account offounda-
tion is ( 1).5'1 
If an object t is essentially independent, it follows that it is possible 
that t has no supplement, i. e. that t could constitute all there is, there be-
ing no whole (in the wide sense) of which twere a part. This possibility, 
which shows the self-sufficiency of the object in a perspicuous light, 
coincides with the conception of an object which is something for itself 
(Etwas-fur-sich) in the late ontology of Brentano, as formulated by 
Chisholm :60 
(17) tis Etwas-fiir-sich : = 0 - ( 3x)( t ~ x) 
This coincidence of notions is an interesting sidelight on the otherwise 
very different worlds of Husserl's ontology of the Logical Investigations 
and the ontology of Brentano in the Kategorienlehre. It suggests that 
Husserl's concepts of dependence and independence could contribute 
valuable insights to the problem of substance, which looms much larger 
for Brentano. 
If S-;-J Ii (then, as we have pointed out, it may be quite accidental to t as 
such, even t as a ~), that it should satisfy the requirement for s for a rt 
One fact which shows this clearly is the possibility in certain cases of dis-
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junctive satisfaction. Suppose, for instance, that Brown is a cat-owner. 
Then, as such, he must possess some cat. But he may possess more than 
one, each of which would, on its own, be sufficient to render him a cat-
owner. At any time at which he owned more than one cat, the loss of one 
would not affect his status as a cat-owner. Indeed, provided he replaced 
cats as they died or he lost them etc., he could, barring catastrophe, re-
main a cat-owner for a time-span far longer than the life of any of his 
cats. In a similar way, a man is biologically dependent for continued life 
upon a regular supply of oxygen, water and nutrients, but the particular 
consignment of such material which actually sustains him will vary 
widely over time. 61 Similar considerations apply to those parts of a thing 
which are essential to its being the sort of thing it is, but which can suffer 
replacement without the thing's ceasing to exist, either because it has 
more than one, and can acquire more as need be, or if it can temporarily 
survive without one. The replacement of cells in organisms gives an ex-
ample of the first kind, while the repairing of machines gives one of the 
second.62 
Having defined the dependence and independence, whether essen-
tial or not, of individuals, we should now define relative dependence 
and independence, concepts of which Husserl makes much use in the in-
vestigation. We first define some more general concepts of individual 
foundation, following the practice established earlier of marking gen-
eralisation by omission of symbols. 
(18) s Ii -11 : = (3 ~)( S a I I; t) 
(19) SI11t : = (3 ~)(SI;I tIt) 
(20) SI t : = (3 ~1l)(Sl;ll1 t) 
The general concept of foundation given by (20) does not make it expli-
cit why S is founded on t. This more general concept frequently occurs 
in Husserl's exposition. 
Husserl defines relative dependence as follows :63 
A content a is relatively dependent with regard to a content ~ (or in regard to the 
total range of contents determined by ~ and all its parts), if a pure law, rooted in 
the peculiar character of the kinds of content in question, ensures that a content 
of the pure genus a has an a priori incapacity to exist except in, or as associated 
with, other contents from the total ranges of the pure genera of contents deter-
mined by ~J. 
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I have quoted this in full because it illustrates vividly the sorts of prob-
lem of interpretation we face in the investigation. In the middle of what 
purports to be a definition, which should therefore be totally unambi-
guous, one finds inserted hedges and adjustments, which make a signifi-
cant difference to the sense. It also displays Husserl's indifference to the 
possible problems of an individual's belonging to various species, since 
the same schematic letters are used for species and for members of these. 
Three possible concepts of relative dependence suggest themselves to 
me on the basis of this passage. The first is that relative dependence is 
nothing other than individual foundation. This is arrived at by simply ig-
noring the bracketed adjustments in the passage and the clause 'or as as-
sociated with'. This identification may not be exact, because of the am-
biguity of the phrase 'determined by W, which might refer to parts of~, 
or essential parts of~, or simply some species to which ~ belongs (it must 
be remembered that here we are following Husserl's ambiguous letter-
ing).1t may be that the concept of individual dependence here suggested 
is not quite the same as that given by our (1 I )-( I 2). 
By taking account of the adjustments beginning 'or .. .' we may ar-
rive at the reading that s, say, is not directly founded on t but on some-
thing 'in its range', i. e. something which is, in the widest sense, a part of 
t. So we have the following alternative concept of individual relative de-
pendence: 
(21) dep)(s,t): = (3x)(x < t& SIX) 
According to (21) anything which is founded on something else is there-
by dependent) with respect to it, a result which is quite in the spirit of 
Husserl's exposition. The converse to this is not true: an object may be 
dependent) on another without being founded on it. To take an example 
from Eugenie Ginsberg's discussion of the Investigation, the shape ofa 
particular brick is founded upon other aspects of the brick, and so this 
individual shape is dependentl upon the waH of which the brick hap-
pens to be a part, yet the shape could hardly be said to be founded upon 
the wal1.64 Ginsberg does not however distinguish between foundation 
and relative dependence, and so some of her attempts to show that Hus-
serl's theorems are not all valid are vitiated. The wide concept of depen-
dence) here canvassed is perhaps somewhat unnatural, and we should 
perhaps take closer cognisance of the phrase 'the total range of contents 
determined by ~ and all its parts'. There is, I think, no telling exactly 
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what this phrase is intended to mean, but the Ginsberg example suggests 
that we choose not merely an adventitious part of the whole t as some-
thing upon which s is founded, but rather take a part which I could not 
but have, i. e. something u such that u < 11, using our abbrieviated de-
vice for showing essential predicates. This then suggests a third possible 
concept of relative dependence: 
(22) dep2(s,t): = (3x)(x < I! & SI x) 
According to this sense, whenever an individual is founded on another, 
it is also dependentz upon it, since for any individual I it is true that 
I < I!. 
Dependence2 does not reduce to foundation however. For one thing, 
S may be dependentz on I and at the same time a part of it, which means 
that, according to (11), s cannot be founded on t. In a case such as this 
we may say that, in one sense at least, S is a dependent part of t: 
(23) depph(s,/): = dep2(s,/) & s < t 
while of course it is similarly possible to define another sense of 'de-
pendent part' through dept: 
(24) depptt(s,t): = dept(s,/) & s < 1 
It is clear of course that if deppt2(s./) then depptt(s,/): the second sense is 
stronger than the first. The close connection between foundation and 
dependent parts may be seen by the following theorem: 
(25) Sl I :::> depPh(s.s+ I) 
where S+ 1 is the aggregate or sum of s and I: the theorem follows from 
definition (23) together with the result that 1 < (s+ I)!; clearly the very 
sum s+ 1 could not but have had I as part.65 This shows that any1hing 
which is founded on something else is thereby a dependent part of a 
whole which is more comprehensive than either the founded or the 
founding part. I t is because of this that the three notions of foundation, 
dependence, and being a dependent part, are so readily confused. It 
may be that Husserl himself did not make the distinctions so clearly as 
we have drawn them, but there is, as has been shown, sufficient evidence 
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from the investigation to show that such fineness of distinction can, and 
was perhaps intended to be, read from the text. 
Recalling the supposition that entities may essentially belong to cer-
tain species, being the individuals they are, we can introduce various no-
tions of essential foundation and dependence which are stronger than 
those we have used hitherto. We can for instance describe an individual 
s as essentially founded on an individual t when s is founded on ! in vir-
tue of some species to which s belongs essentially: 
(26) essfd(s,f): = ( 3 ~)( s! E ~ & s;1 I) 
while I essentially founds s when s is founded on t through a species to 
which t must belong: 
(27) essfg(s,t): = (3~)(t! E~& sl~t) 
and a yet stronger relation can be obtained either by conjoining these, 
or, stronger yet, by insisting that the species a, ~ such that s~ ~l' are such 
that s! Ea and t! E~. 
We have already mentioned the possibility of disjunctive or generic 
satisfaction of an individual's need by other individuals. For though s 
may be in some sense essentially founded on I, this may not mean that s 
could not have been essentially founded on something other than tsatis-
fying the same requirement. To take a biological example, an organism 
as such is, let us suppose, essentially founded at any time on some con-
signment of water, but any other consignment would have done equally 
well. Similarly an internal combustion engine is essentially founded on 
a supply of lubricant (here it is obvious that we mean a functioning en-
gine, not a museum-piece), but again which particular mass of lubricant 
does the job is not important. A ship-launching ceremony might be 
thought to be essentially founded upon a bottle of champagne, but it 
need not have been just the one which was used. In other cases, how-
ever, an individual s is not only essentially founded on some other thing 
t, but it could only have been t upon which it was so founded. In such 
cases we may introduce definitions based on formulas such as Sl t!, 
s! E a & Sal t!, and I! E ~ & Sill!!; which can themselves be used to further 
define notions of dependent parts. So we might be then equipped to say 
in what sense it is essential to a man that he has not just any brain, but 
this very brain, whereas it is not essential to him that he have this very 
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heart, or in what sense it is essential to a person that he or she should 
have the very parents he or she did have.06 There is perhaps at present 
little point in doing more than indicating that there is here a wide range 
of questions and issues, some of them bearing on regularly-debated is-
sues such as personal identity, together with a rich fund of possible con-
cepts of dependence, all developed out of Husserl's ideas, and requiring 
further refinement. 
We can however indicate a possible formulation of Husserl's attempt 
to define the pregnant concept of whole in terms of foundation. We 
need here individual foundation, as was argued earlier. Firstly we de-
fine directfoundational relatedness: two things are directly foundation-
ally related when one is founded on the other: 
(28) dfr(s,/):=.\'1 tv tis 
Then we define foundational relatedness as the (proper) ancestral of the 
relation of direct foundational relatedness :07 
(29) fr(s.t) : = dfr' O(s.l) 
Thus two entities are foundationally related if one founds the other, or 
both found or are founded on some third thing, or one founds and the 
other is founded on some third thing, etc. Then an entity is a pregnant 
whole when all its parts, in this case its proper parts, are foundationally 
related to one another, and no part is foundationally related to anything 
else outside this entity: 
(30) Prwh(s):= (Vxy)(x~s :J«y~s& x =# y) = fr(x.y») 
While it is thus not too difficult to express Husserl's idea symbolically it 
is much harder to see what it amounts to in practice. In theory the world 
should partition itself neatly into discrete entities, each of which is a 
pregnant whole. (Entities are discrete when they have no common part.) 
It might however be the case that every entity is foundationally related to 
every other, in which case there would be no partition, and only one 
pregnant whole, the world itself. This result would certainly be counted 
as in some sense monistic. It is possible that the sort of whole which H us-
serl had in mind when discussing pregnant wholes would be lesser in ex-
tent~ to capture such wholes we might need to take a tighter foundation 
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relation as the basis for the definition of foundational connectedness. In 
general, the stronger such a relation, the tighter the organisation of the 
resulting wholes, the smaller in extent they are, and the more there are of 
them. So it seems that rather than there being a single concept of preg-
nant whole, there are several, having in common a recipe for generation 
from a concept of individual foundation. This is a characteristic out-
come of studying the third investigation: ideas which at first sight seem 
sharp show themselves to hide various possible interpretations. 
§ 5 Husserl's Six Theorems 
An illustration of the difficulty is the attempt to interpret the six the-
orems of § 14: one has to use these as a guide to what H usserl meant at 
the same time as attempting to see whether they are valid or not. It is in-
structive to examine these and Husserl's proofs for them. We already 
saw above how Theorem I, interpreted as (7), is valid. Here is Theorem 
II :68 
A whole which includes a non-independent moment without including, as its 
part the supplement which that moment demands, is likewise non-independent, 
and is so relatively to every superordinate independent whole in which that non-
independent moment is contained. 
Husserl states that this follows from Theorem I as a corollary, given a de-
finition of relative dependence. But he is wrong in this. Theorem I is stat-
ed in terms of species, whereas Theorem II relates to individuals. Here is 
a place where the transition between these two levels is not so simple as 
Husserl believes. We can give an example of things satisfying the intui-
tions represented by Theorem II which do not in any obvious way satis-
fy those of Theorem I. Let us call any expression which requires comple-
tion by only names or other singular terms to yield a sentence a predicate. 
Then the English verb 'loves' is a predicate, requiring completion by two 
names to obtain a sentence. In the sentence' John loves Mary' the names 
'John' and 'Mary' satisfy this double requirement. Now the predicate 
'loves Mary' also has a requirement for supplementation by a name, and 
in the given sentence this requirement is met by the name 'John'. We 
might say that in the given sentence the predicate 'loves Mary' inherits 
from the predicate 'loves' that requirement which is met by the name 
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'John' ,69 This is in conformity with the way in which the first part of The-
orem II is phrased: the predicate 'loves Mary' does not contain all the 
supplements demanded by its part 'loves', and so inherits from the latter 
the demand satisfied by 'John'. But the most obvious way of expressing 
this in the terms of Theorem I is to substitute the term 'predicate' for 'a' 
and 'name' for 'W. But in that case we should render 'a)W as 'predicate 
which does not contain a name as part': but precisely 'loves John' is a 
predicate which contains a name as part. It may be that this particular 
kind of multiple satisfaction was not considered by Husserl in his phras-
ing of Theorem I. To show that Theorem II does indeed follow from 
Theorem I we should have to be assured that whenever we have things 
satisfying the premisses in Theorem I I we can always find a pair of spe-
cies a and ~i such that Theorem I is satisfied with respect to the supple-
ment which the larger whole inherits from the smaller moment. It seems 
to me dubious that we should be able to establish this in full generality, 
so it may be that Husserl's theorems require another axiom to support 
them, such as the following: 
Some such principle does indeed seem to be taken as self-evident by 
Husser!, but it cannot be directly proved from the proof of Theorem I, 
because it is compatible with the principles of this theorem that ais an ct, 
his a Ii such that a ,;-1 I' h. and that cis an u) Ii, and so itself requires a I) for 
completion, hut rather than inheriting a's requirement satisfied by h, its 
requirement is satisfied by some further I), say h'. It is hard to find a con-
vincing example of this state of affairs, which leads me to concur with 
Husserl. The nearest to a counterexample that I have managed is this: let 
'a' be replaced by 'represented district' and 'If by 'representative': the 
relevant whole being a district together with its representative. Now a 
council ward may be part of a parliamentary constituency, but the con-
stituency, even if it does not contain the councillor who represents the 
ward, does not inherit the requirement for him, but has its own require-
ment met by its Member of Parliament. However, the force of this pur-
ported counterexample is somewhat blunted by the possible ambiguity 
in the notion of 'district', which might, one may say, have a bare geogra-
phical meaning and a more sophisticated administrative one. It might 
be argued that it is only in the administrative sense that a district's re-
presentation requirements arise, whereas it is only in the geographical 
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sense that the ward is part of the constituency. In administrative terms 
the ward is not part of the constituency, but a completely different entity 
entering into quite different governmental arrangments. It is here that 
we face the problem of whether it is one and the same thing which is both 
a council ward and part of the parliamentary constituency, or rather 
whether these two coincide. 
Given such uncertainties, it is far from apparent that Theorem II is, as 
Husserl takes it to be, a mere corollary of Theorem I. For this reason I 
shall confine myself to discussing the consequences of (31) taken as axio-
matic, together with our other assumptions, rather than attempt to estab-
lish (31) or something like it. It can be seen that Theorem II follows 
very readily from (31 ), in its two parts, if interpreted as follows: 
(32) (sl u & s < 1& u <i. I) ::) depJ( I.u) 
(33) (sl u & s < 1& u <i. t & u < v) ::) depI(t.v) 
In fact we can show not just (32), but the stronger formula obtained by 
replacing the consequent of (32) by 'II u' . Further, there does not ap-
pear to be any need for Husserl to restrict the superordinate wholes v 
merely to those which are independent. With these minor reservations, 
we can endorse Husserl's Theorem II provided we are prepared (a) to 
gloss 'dependent', as 'dependentJ' and provided (b) we accept (31). 
Husserl's Theorem III is given in two versions: these both in effect 
amount to the transitivity of the relation 'is an independent part or. We 
shall use therefore a simple version: 
If s is an independent part of t and t is an independent part of u then s is an inde-
pendent part of u. 
To clarify this we must first give a definition of 'independent part'. The 
obvious one will do: 
(34) indptJ(s.t): = s< t & '" depJ(s.t) 
One could also define similarly a relation indph based on the relation 
dep2 but the one we have given here fits the bill more closely. For in the 
presence of (31-3) it becomes easy to prove that 




by much the method Husserl uses in his informal proof of Theorem III, 
except that Husserl appeals both to Theorems I and II, whereas, be-
cause of the difficulties we have alluded to, we appeal only to (31) and 
its consequences. 
Irrespective of the merits of (31), Husserl's fourth theorem is valid. 
His formulation is: 70 
If s is a dependent part of a whole t, it is also a dependent part of every other 
whole of which t is a part. 
We can represent this as 
(36) (depptt(s,t) & t < u) => depptt(s,u) 
and it follows immediately from the definition of deppt, and the tran-
sitivity of the part-whole relation • < '. In fact it is a more general thesis 
that 
(37) (depl(s,t) & t < u) => dept(s,u) 
It should be noticed that this was the assumption questioned by Gins-
berg in her brick example, and the principle is harmless once the differ-
ence between individual foundation and the more general relation of 
relative dependence, in the sense of dept, is made clear. One particular 
restriction of (36) yields the transitivity of depptt. It must be noted that 
both depptt and indptt are transitive, but that the former is in many ways 
the more obvious notion. For as Husserl defines relative independence, 
it does not entail independence tout court, whereas this is true for rela-
tive dependence. The reason can be seen in the notion of independent 
part. That a is an independent part of b means only that a is not founded 
on anything within the range of b; it does not mean that there is not 
something else outside b upon which a is founded. Husserl states this 
explicitly as his Theorem V : to represent this we must give some derelativ-
ised notions of dependence and independence derived from the rela-
tive notions we have been using. It is for instance possible to define's is 
founded' as meaning simply 'sis founded on something', and similarly 
for 'sis dependent'. But because of the interrelation between dept and 
"I these amount to the same thing, so we shall simply say 
(38) depl(s) : = ( 3x)(dept(s,x» 
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and define something as independent1 when it is not dependentJ: 
(39) indJ(s) : = - dep1(s) 
The nice thing about this definition is that we can link now the notion of 
independence and dependence of an individual previously given as 
(13-14) in terms of its membership of a species, with the new derelativ-
ised notions stated in terms of individuals; by virtue of the principles 
(11-12) the following is a theorem: 
(40) 0 ( \f x)(ind(x) == ind 1(x)) 
so naturally the two contraries, dep and dep1, are necessarily equivalent 
also. This shows that the detour through relative dependence and inde-
pendence brings us back to the same position as we started from when 
considering the generic concept of foundation. 
Husserl's Theorem V simply says 
A relatively dependent object is also absolutely dependent, whereas a relatively 
independent object may be dependent in an absolute sense. 
and we can see how, in our interpretation, this is unproblematically COT-
rect. 
The final Theorem VI reads 
If a and b are independent parts of some whole C, they are also independent rela-
tive to one another. 
If we render this as 
(41) (indpt1(a,c) & indpt1(b,c)) :J - (dep1(a,b) v depl(b,a)) 
then brief consideration shows that it is true, for were either a or b de-
pendent on the other, since each is a part of ~ the dependent one would 
by definition be dependent on ~ contrary to the assumption; this is pre-
cisely the form of reasoning followed by Husserl in his proof. 
We can thus see a way through the six theorems of § 14. Given the ax-
ioms and definitions hitherto suggested, the principle (31), which Hus-
serl took to be self-evident, and the selection of dep1 and not dep2 as the 
relevant notion of dependence, all six follow. It is suggested then that 
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this constitutes an acceptable interpretation of what Husserl meant, 
which has the merit ()f making the theorems all valid if the axioms 
( 11-1231) are valid. clbis verdict on the semi-formal work of § 14 may 
be contrasted with that ofGinsberg/' whom we suggested did not sepa-
rate indtvidual foundation from relative dependence, and whose criti-
cisms of H usserl cannot therefore be accepted. 
If, as suggested earlier, there are various possible concepts of depen-
dence and independence which we could formulate without being un-
faithful to Husserl's intentions, then it would be necessary to test these 
against the six theorems of § 14 in much the samt.~ way as we have done 
for the concepts connected with dep, But the tests would be more com-
plex, because of the essentialistic nature of many of the stronger defini-
tions. After § 14 Husserl moves on to discuss various other whole-part 
notions which can be defined in his terms, such as mediate and immedi-
ate parts, abstractum and concretum, etc. 'Ibese will obviously inherit 
any ambiguities possessed by the hasic notions. Rather than follow up 
all the various possihle interpretations, I shall instead turn to possible 
applications of Husserl's concepts within ontology. Applications in 
grammar, in particular the question of the dependence-status of differ-
ent sentence-patts, and the structure of sentences, I hope to deal with 
elsewhere. For a summary of other applications which have been made, 
the reader should consult the essay by Smith and Mulligan earlier in this 
volume. 
~ 6 Applications 
One problem which was very much a live issue in Husserl's day, but 
which subsequently became buried, is the question of a distinction be-
tween ordinary or genuine objects and objects of higher order. 72 Such a 
distinction was fundamental to Meinong's theory of objects, and sug-
gests a kind of logical or ontological atomism whereby the basic objects 
are those of lowest order, there being aggregates, classes and complexes 
constituted on the basis of these. Husserl's account of categorial objects, 
or objects of the understanding, is very much in the same vein,7J and In-
garden too, defends the difference between his concepts of self-suffi-
ciency and independence by invoking this distinction. 74 Findlay has 
suggested, in commentary on Meinong, that the implied atomism is un-
tenable.; We have, in Husserl's concepts of the third investigation, the 
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wherewithal for re-examining the issues. It may be simply misleading to 
regard objects with other objects as their pieces as somehow less self-
sufficient than the pieces. The organs of an organism, while pieces of the 
organism in the sense that they are both separately presentable and phy-
sically separable,76 considered as living tissue they are dependent for 
their continued existence on that of the organism of which they are part; 
in this sense they are moments rather than pieces of it. For the most vital 
organs, this dependence is reciprocal. The way is quite open to allow 
that some larger objects are in fact more self-sufficient than their smaller 
parts. One example which is mentioned by Husserl,77 and which 
Findlay also cites as militating against the atomistic view of objects, 78 in-
volves time. Temporal durations, considered not merely as abstractly 
extended parts of an abstract extended whole, but as concretely occu-
pied by events and processes in the natural world, can no longer be seen 
as mere pieces, but must be regarded as dependent parts or moments of 
the whole. This suggests that the ontology which conceives of the world 
as made up offour-dimensional entities, of which the familiarthree-di-
mensional objects of everyday experience constitute merely temporal 
cross-sections, is mistaken in supposing that temporally determined ob-
jects are sliceable in time in just the same way as a thing is sliceable in 
space. The theory of four-dimensional space-time objects can be ac-
cused of failing to distinguish between things and processes. 
A similar consideration might help to dampen somewhat that peren-
nially appealing aspect of all forms of atomism, micro-reductionism. If 
an entity can be shown to be complex, to consist of parts in a determi-
nate relation to one another, it is the assumption of micro-reductionism 
that everything which could be meaningfully said about the complex 
could be expressed mentioning only its parts and their properties and re-
lations. There is no doubt that in many areas of empirical investigation 
our understanding of entities is furthered by seeing how they are put to-
gether. The gains in understanding achieved fuel the drive to find ever 
more fundamental particles or constituents of matter in physics. It is 
sometimes suggested that there is no end to how far such reductions can 
be carried. But the assumption need not go unchallenged. At some stage 
of our knowledge of the physical world it might be reasonable for the 
philosopher to suggest that the bunch-of-grapes model of complexity is 
not the appropriate one. This might occur when the known fundamental 
particles fall into families by their characteristics, but there has been a 
prolonged inability to isolate the supposed constituents of these. Rather 
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t han seeing the particles as consisting of more fundamental ones held to-
gether by a particularly strong natural glue, it might be hypothetised that 
the more fundamental parts of the isolable particles are not pieces but 
moments, which are mutually founding. As Husserl pointed out, such 
parts need not have any other part or constituent whose job was to hold 
them together, but require each other by their very nature. Such mo-
ments might be compared with the distinctive features of phonological 
theory,79 which cannot be isolated but which explain the resemblances 
of phonemes, which can. 
A rather similar but less universally appealing kind of unifying reduc-
t ion of explanation is reduction upwards. macro-reduction, which seeks 
explanation of phenomena in terms of the objects in question belonging 
to some more inclusive totality with its own properties, a whole of which 
they can be seen to be mere moments. The supreme macro-reductionist 
was Hegel. Like the micro-reductionist, the macro-reductionist claims 
that nothing gets lost in his reductive explanation. An intermediate posi-
tion might contend that micro- and macro-reductionism make opposite 
but cognate mistakes, the micro-reductionist taking all part-whole rela-
tions as relations of piece to whole, while the macro-reductionist takes 
all such relations as relations of moment to whole. The benefit of the ob-
servations drawn from Husserl is not just that it gives us a way to draw 
the parallels between the atomist and the holist, but that because there 
are various possible senses of dependence and cognate concepts, it can 
be made clear that there is not just one possible atomism or holism, but 
several, so that atomism of one kind might be quite compatible with ho-
lism of another. The atomist who sees a man as an aggregate of particles, 
and the holist who sees him as a mere mode or moment of some greater 
whole, may simply have different criteria for what it is to be an inde-
pendent whole. 
The question as to what constitutes a nalural whole is probably not 
one which could receive a single answer. Which entities constitute natu-
ral wholes is something which cannot be settled a priori, but must be the 
concern of the empirical sciences. The sorts of object which we consider 
as having a tightness of organisation making it fitting to call them wholes 
in a natural sense seem to have a greater degree of causal coherence. and 
relative causal isolation from outside phenomena, than those which we 
should be less inclined to describe as natural wholes. The necessity to 
speak in terms of degrees of isolation and coherence suggests that there 
can be a spectrum of natural wholes of which some are more clearly 
units than others. The paradigmatic examples of natural wholes would 
appear to be organisms, although these too can be from certain points of 
view taken as mere moments of some greater whole, involving say a spe-
cies or an eco-system, while from other points of view they are aggre-
gates of other wholes, such as cells, molecules etc., which have an integ-
rity of their own. Other natural unities are not dissimilar from organisms 
e. g. in the manner in which they are able to utilise energy. Thunder-
storms and river-systems have been suggested as examples.80 Aristotle 
considered stars were not only natural but living unities, an opinion 
which is by no means so implausible as it appears at first sight. 81 Such a 
readiness to see analogies between living or organic unities and other 
natural wholes need be neither anthropomorphic nor need it deny the 
ubiquity of causal explanation, since it is precisely the causal integrity of 
a natural whole or system which binds it together. This is not something 
imposed on reality from outside by our mode of cognition, but repres-
ents organisation which is intrinsic and which we discover. 
According to this way of considering the multiplicity of ways in which 
things are connected in the physical world, the distinction between low-
er- and higher-order objects need not be an absolute one, with a single 
bedrock layer of natural units, but an object may be from one point of 
view a natural unit, from another it may coincide with an aggregate of 
differently organised units, or again be a moment of a greater whole. 
The fact that objects are naturally organised in many ways ensures that 
this relativity is not the mere imposition of a conceptual scheme on an 
otherwise unstructured world, but cuts along natural seams in reality. 
When we move from considerations of units in nature to units in other 
spheres, such as social, legal and economic wholes, causal considera-
tions are no longer so predominant, although they still apply. The unity 
of many man-machine wholes, such as a manned vehicle, is still pre-
dominantly one of relative causal self-containedness, while that of so-
cial wholes such as clubs, families, societies, or the various differently-
sized units in an army or a business enterprise, require further considera-
tions relating also, e. g., to functions and lines of control or authority. 
Such considerations may cut across those of causal or spatio-temporal 
proximity. It is, again, the merit of the vocabulary developed by Husserl 
that such matters can be discussed without an undue reliance on meta-
phor, and in full recognition that there will be very many different kinds 
of relation constituting the various kinds of whole brought into consid-
eration. 
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One strand in the skein going to make up the traditional notion of sub-
stance is that a substance is what exists by itself, without needing the ex-
istence of anything beyond itself. In Husserl's terms, such an object is 
absolutely independent. Given the many different possible senses of'in-
dependent' we could envisage various different senses of 'substance'. It 
might indeed be the case that some of the historic disputes over sub-
stance could be clarified by showing how different philosophers were 
operating with different concepts of independence. It is noteworthy that 
Husserl nowhere speaks in the third investigation of substance. His ac-
count is furthermore purely formal, and proceeds without assumptions 
as to which sorts of object are the most basic or paradigmatic independ-
entwholes. 
§ 7 Relations and Foundation 
We have mentioned in several places the importance of relations be-
tween parts of a whole in constituting it as the whole it is. Many of our 
examples used nouns with a clearly derelativised sense, such as · 'hus-
band', 'sibling' and so on. We can very often generate one or more such 
nouns from a relative term, sometimes artificially. Sometimes the dere-
lativised nouns are common enough to be etymologically unconnected 
with the relative term in question, as e. g. 'husband' and 'wife' have no 
etymological connection with the relative 'is married to', and may in-
deed be far more familiar than the relative notion which defines them. 
The term 'lake' for instance corresponds to no cognate verb expressing 
the relation of being land surrounding an expanse of water. Generally 
speaking, the more closely related things are affected in their properties 
by their particular relation, the more likely we are to have derelativised 
nouns to describe the relata as such. This is a partial explanation for the 
richness of the vocabulary of derelativised nouns dealing with human 
social and kinship relations, for the relations human beings have to one 
another mark and are marked by characteristic forms of behaviour of 
the people concerned. 
It might be thought that we always can generate a foundation relation 
whenever we can obtain a pair of derelativised nouns from a relative 
term. Suppose for instance that given any binary relation R we define a 
pair of nouns by derelativisation as follows: 
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(42) tE RJ : = (3x)(tRx) 
(43) t E R2 : = ( 3x)(xRt) 
Does it follow automatically that RJ I R2 and R2 I RJ ? The answer is 
no: while we automatically get that RJ "+ R2 and vice versa, the stronger 
condition imposed by (2) means that R gives rise to foundation relations 
in the strong sense under these conditions : 
(44) RJ IR2 iff O( 'VX)(XE RJ ::> (3y)(xRy&x <' y&y <' x) 
(45) R2IRdffO('Vx)(xER2::>(3y)(yRx&x<' y&y<, x) 
Clearly any relation which is symmetric and for which (44- 5) held, 
would give rise to a derelativised self-founding species term: for exam-
ple from ~possesses the same parents as and is different from' we get ~sib­
ling' while 'is working together with' gives ~collaborator'. 
Certain relative terms which possess etymologically related derela-
tivised nouns fail this test, perhaps rather surprisingly. For example ~em­
ploys', 'loves', 'shaves', with their nouns 'employer' / ~employee', 
'lover' / ~loved' etc. have neither of the cognate pair of nouns founding 
the other. The reason is that it is possible that all employers, lovers, shav-
ers, etc. employ, love and shave only themselves. In general, so long as a 
relation couldbe reflexive, even by accident, i. e. 
(46) O( 'V xy)(xRy ::> x = y) 
then there is no reason why either of RJ, R2 should be founded on the 
other. Of course, in the weaker sense of foundation given by , "+ " there 
is always reciprocal foundation: there can be no employer without an 
employee, no lover without a loved one etc. But where general reflexivi-
ty is possible, this sort of requirement is not a requirement for an asso-
ciated entity as such. It follows that any relative term possessing the logi-
cal property of reflexivity, including all equivalence relations, all partial 
orderings and especially identity, fails to give rise to foundation rela-
tions in the strong sense. 
One obviously germane relation is the whole-part relation. In fact, if 
we consider the relation of being a proper part, symbolised' -< ' , we shall 
see that this gives rise to one self-founding derelativised term. For' -< l' 
is self-founding, whereas it is not true that -< J I -< 2, or that -< 2 I -< t, or 
that -< 2 I -< 2. The reason that none of the last three is true is that we can 
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envisage the situation where the world consists of precisely two atoms, 
i. e. is a whole with only two proper parts. Again, it is certainly true that 
~ I ""+ ~ 2 and vice versa, i. e. that there cannot be a proper part unless 
there is a proper whole or container, and vice versa, but the stronger rela-
tion of founding is ruled out by the restrictions of (2) as manifested in 
(44- 5). The obvious noun-phrase corresponding to • ~ I' is simply 
'proper part'. Because of the mereologicallaw that to every proper part 
nr a whole there must correspond a complementary proper part of that 
whole, i. e. an object disjoint from it (sharing no parts) which together 
with it makes up the whole, or, symbolically: 
(47) O( V' xy)(x~y =( 3z)(x L Z & Y = x+ z) 
it follows that ~ I or 'proper part' stands for a self-founding species. It 
turns out then that even the terms 'whole' and 'part' are derelativised 
from one or other of the relations 'is part of or 'is a proper part of ; this 
fact leads Husserl into local difficulties in expounding the idea of an in-
dependent part, since while it is natural to say that a (proper) part as 
such cannot exist apart from its whole, for independent parts we also 
want to say that the object which is here in fact a part could exist outside 
this particular whole. R2 The difficulty is only one of expression, how-
ever, not of suhstance. 
Having seen how foundation relations may arise of relative terms, we 
might tum the issue round and ask whether all foundation relations 
point back to some underlying and more basic relative term. The ques-
tion must first he made more precise however, since for any pair of spe-
cies a, f3 such that al I{, we always have the relative term',~ II '. We are try-
ing to get beyond this however and ask whether an CL which is founded 
on a ~ is so hecause of some relation which is not defined in terms of CL 
and~, but which may indeed be used in definition of these terms, as in 
the case of derelativisation already mentioned. If we follow H usserl's 
opinion on this, we should have to deny it. For Husserl claims that al-
though colour and extension are mutually founding, there is nothing in 
the concepts colour and extension which points to any such underlying 
relation. SJ It is H usserl contends, precisely in this lack of a means to ren-
der the law of mutual dependence for colour and extension as an in-
stance of a logical or formal principle that there consists the synthetic a 
priori status of the statement that colour is impossible without extension 
and vice versa. Were it possible to treat 'colour' and 'extension' as nouns 
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definable by derelativisation from, some antecedently given relative 
term, the dependence in question would be analytic rather than synthet-
ic. While it seems to me that Husserl's distinction between analytic and 
synthetic is not so sharp as he thought it was,84 the mere possibility that 
there should be acceptable cases of foundation where the necessity is 
not obviously logical leaves in doubt the possibility of always finding an 
underlying relation'. 
I 
It is worth considering a way of making a distinction among relations 
which can be found at its clearest perhaps in Meinong, who also brings 
this distinction into play when discussing the difference between ge-
nuine and higher-order objects.as Some relations, such as difference, si-
milarity, being the same height, and the like, do not bring their terms into 
any real connection, but rather leave them quite unaffected by being 
thus related. Standing in such relations makes no difference to the pro-
perties of the terms; it is indeed often the case that they stand in such a 
relation in virtue of the separate properties that they possess. Such rela-
tions are themselves built or founded on their terms. We may call these 
ideal relations. Other relations, such as acting upon, magnetically at-
tracting, playing tennis against, bring their terms into connection in that, 
had the relation not obtained, the properties of one or both of the terms 
would have been different. We may call these real relations. The most 
obvious examples of real relations involve some causal link. Now some 
foundation relations have underlying relative terms corresponding only 
to ideal relations, which means that the unity engendered by the founda-
tion is in a sense extrinsic to the objects related. Many ideal relations are 
equivalence relations, and since these are reflexive they are in any case, 
by the result above, powerless to engender genuine foundation rela-
tions. But where there is some real connection between the terms of a re-
lation, these terms, described in a way which implies the properties in-
duced by the relation, will, if the relation in question satisfies one of 
(44- 5), be foundationally related. We could then describe the relation 
as a moment of the whole uniting the parts. While these remarks are only 
schematic, it does seem to me that a theory of the unity of wholes can 
only be developed in conjunction with an adequate theory of relations: 
the two enterprises must proceed together. It is perhaps not accidental 
that the importance of the interconnection between relations and 
wholes only arises as a serious issue once the Leibnizian dogma that 
whatever exists is one is called into question. 
One of the considerations we derive from examining the role of rela-
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lions in engendering foundation is the impoverished role of reflexive re-
lations, including especially equivalence relations. The role of the latter 
III modern theories of abstraction is well-known. But from the ontologi-
L'al point of view reflexive relations are as such highly dubious. While we 
may be perfectly prepared to allow a relative term to be flanked by a pair 
or names for the same thing, and yield a true sentence, it is a different 
matter again if we ask what relation corresponds to the term. The whole 
notion of a relation which holds between a thing and itself is suspect,80 
;Illd the more especially when, in the case of identity, it can only hold be-
l ween a thing and itself. This difficulty can be found for instance in 
II ume and Wittgenstein.87 It is usual these days to dismiss their problem 
as a pseudo-problem resulting from the confusion of a sign with the 
thing signified.88 But the objection IS not that there is a certain kind of 
relative term which can generate true sentences. It is rather that nothing 
IIlstrinsically rclational is represented by this sign, if indeed anything at 
all is represented. Nor is this to deny the cognitive value of such relative 
terms. It is to object that they are ontologically sterile. Where a reflexive 
relation may also hold bctween different things, as e. g. 'is the same 
height as'. it can always he traded in for the anti-reflexive variant, e. g. 'is 
the same height as and different from'. Such terms may now generate 
foundation relations between their derelativisations. Indeed those per-
pkxing derelativisations like 'employer' / 'employee', etc. are most hap-
pily applied when reflexivity is not envisaged: it does sound wrong to 
describe a self-employed person as either an employer or an employee, 
Of a narcissist as a lover, and it is because of such anti-reflexive uses that 
we have the derelativised nouns at all. It may be of more than etymologi-
cal interest that many of the terms for eqlllvalence relations are in fact 
derived from their associated adjectives or nouns, even, it should he not-
L'd, identity. 
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',lyC,. Wl)rks .tre ('iled under the name and year 111 which they appear there. 
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I An earlier version of this essay was read at the Colloquium 'Whole-Part Theory and the 
History of Logic' held by the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy at the University 
of Sheffield in May 1978. My thanks go especially to David Bell, Kevin Mulligan, Her-
man Philipse and Barry Smith for their help and constructive criticism. 
2 When William Kneale visited Husserl in Freiburg in January 1928, he relates that Hus-
serl "told me that his essay Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen in his Log. Unto was 
the best starting point for a study. n (From part of a letter to Herbert Spiegelberg quoted 
in Spiegelberg, 1971, n. 25, p. 78.) 
1 For Husserl on formal theories see LUI §§ 67-72. The ideas are expanded consider-
ably in Husserl, 1929. 
" The example is Husserl's: LUII/l 254, LI 457. A purely formal proposition which is 
true is free of all existential assumptions, § 12 ibid. 
s Wittgenstein, 1961,4.1272 tells us that words like 'object', 'concept', 'complex' and 
'fact' signify formal concepts, and are represented in a Begriffsschri/t by variables. Cf. 
also 3.325. 
6 This concept of variability of all propositional constituents except the logical constants 
can be found already in Bolzano. Cf. his definition of logical analyticity and universal 
satisfaction in Bolzano, 1837, §§ 147-8, a work which influenced Husserl profoundly. 
7 For explicit repudiations of formalism in mathematics cf. e.g. Husserl, 1929, § 39. 
8 For an introduction to Lesniewski's work see Luschei, 1962 or Lejewski, 1958. For Les-
niewski the division between logical and non-logical theories comes between his Onto-
logy and his Mereology, so for him whole-part theory contains non-logical constants. 
Leonard and Goodman, 1940 or Goodman, 1977 blur such a distinction by defining 
ideptity mereologically. For an axiomatisation of the whole-part theory in Goodman, 
1977 see Breitkopf, 1978. 
9 LUII/1252, LI455. 
10 Such a theory is explicitly canvassed at § 24. 
II Aristotle, 1928, Ch. 2, where Aristotle contrasts being part of a subject with being in a 
subject in such a way as to be incapable of existence apart from it. 
12 Stumpf, 1873. 
13 Husserl, 1894. 
I" But compare my third essay below, where a nominalistically acceptable conception of 
set is described. 
IS Cf. the discussion in § 18, where Husserl is not altogether clear whether it is possible to 
give examples of proper parts of a whole which are not proper parts of proper parts of 
this whole. 
16 Wiggins, 1976. Cf. the mereological applications in Wiggins, 1980. 
17 Cf. Locke, 1975, Book II, Ch. 27: "In the state of living Creatures, their Identity de-
pends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but on something else. For in them the varia-
tion of great parcels of Matter alters not the Identity"; p. 330. 
18 Chisholm, 1976, Ch. 3 and appendices A-B. 
19 Wiggins, 1980 uses a whole-part theory strengthened with the operator nec to argue for 
this conception and against Chisholm's entia successiva. 
20 Cf. § 12 of the fourth investigation, where it is declared that 'round square' cannot 
correspond to any object: LUIII I 326, LI517. Later, in Husserl, 1948, § 91 the exten-
sion of a pure species is said to comprise pure possibilities. 
21 § 2, LUII/1252, LI455. 
22 In commentary on Aristotle, Anscombe in fact replaces Aristotle's accident example by 
a boundary example: Anscombe and Geach, 1961, pp. 7-8. 
· 23 It is indicative of Husserl's low reliance on categories that he is very reluctant, by com-
parison with later philosophers, to brand sentences as nonsensical. Cf. his distinction in 
Investigation IV, § 12, between nonsense and absurdity. 
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2.4 Husserl, 1948, § 32a. In § 32b Husserl adds connections as yet a further distinct kind of 
dependent part to accidents (which he calls 'qualities') and boundaries. 
15 § 22, LUll/t 280, LI478-9. 
26 Ibid .• LUll/t 279, L1477. 
27 As Husserl says, LUll/1 280, L1478, "Unity is ... a categoriat predicate." 
28 § II, LU1I/1252, L1455. 
29 Perhaps the clearest statement of this is in § 148 of Hussert, 1913. Cf. Beilage 74 of the 
Husserliana edition (p. 625), where Husserl clarifies the statement in the text. It will be-
come clear in my third essay below that I do not share Hussert's view that a nominalisa-
tion is necessary to constitute a set as a new object on the basis of plural reference. 
30 Cf. Husserl on collectivaat Investigation VI, § 51, LUII/2 159, L1798. Though the sec-
tion title also mentions disjunctiva the section has strangely nothing to say about such 
things. 
31 § 22, LUII/I 279-80, L1478. 
32 § 14, LUII/I 261, LI463. 
l3 § 13, LUII/I 258, LI460. 
34 In § 14 this is seen by the ad hoc use of a suffix, in § 13 by the lack of articles. Hussert's 
usage of symbols is sloppy by modem standards. 
J5 Cf. the remark that we can use the same expressions for individuals and species as a 
'harmless equivocation'. § 14, LUII/I 261, LI463. 
36 Ibid. 
37 § 21, LUII/I 275, L1475. 
38 Cf. Proposition 5 of§ 14, LUII/1263, LI465. 
39 This suggestion was made to me by Barry Smith, as an improvement on an earlier for-
mulation of mine which required that a. s and ~ s be such that no a. ever be part of a ~ or 
vice versa. Both these ideas are inadequate, as the case of self-founding species shows. 
40 § 14, LUII/I 261, LI463. 
41 § 21, LUll/t 276, L1475. 
42 On entailment see above all Anderson and Belnap 1975. 
43 § 14, LUII/I 262, LI463. 
« This is one place where the definition offoundation using entailment suggested at (4) is 
too strong for our purposes, because the definition of 'a.) ~' is extensional while that of 
, -, , in (4) is relevant and intensional, and the restrictions in Eon e. g. importation make 
it impossible to prove (7) as it stands. However by strengthening the definition (6) a rele-
vant version of (7) could be proved. 
4S § 16. 
46 Herman Philipse has objected that the husband/wife type examples are analytic, 
whereas Husserl is clearly interested in synthetic connections such as the colourl exten-
sion example. Two things may be said in reply. Firstly, the distinction Husserl draws be-
tween analytic and synthetic is not as sharp as he thought it was. This is an issue which I 
hope to take up elsewhere, though note the remarks in n. 77 of the opening essay by 
Smith and Mulligan. Secondly, as Husserl is really interested in an a priori theory (§ 24) 
no harm at all can be done by including analytic as well as synthetic examples. 
47 Ginsberg, 1929. Cf. my note to the translation of her later paper in this volume. 
48 Cf. Husserl, 1913, § 14. 
49 Ibid., § 12. 
so For an implicit recognition of this in Leibniz, cf. Leibniz 1903, 261. Cf. more explicitly 
Ishiguro, 1972, 16. 
Sl I had previously thought that it made some sense to talk of individuals simply as such, 
without mention or assumption of any kind to which they might belong. Many sources 
have dissuaded me of this view, but David Bell and Herman Philipse have done so most 
directly_ 
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52 Aquinas, 1964-76, la, 44, 4; Vol. 8, p. 21, where Aquinas argues that in creating God 
does not act from need but 'simply to give of his goodness'. At the same time the idea 
that God's nature could have been other than it is is not particularly congenial for Aqui-
nas, so his problem is not completely cleared. 
53 Ingarden, 1964-5, §§ 12-15. 
54 For a note on these translations cf. my introduction to Ginsberg's paper. 
S5 Ibid. § 12. 
S6 Ibid. § 13. 
57 Ibid. § 14. 
58 Ibid. § 15. 
59 One of Ingarden's examples of a heteronomous object would be any entity which is 
purely noematic, a correlate of consciousness, so Ingarden could fairly claim that the 
material for such a distinction exists already in Husserl. 
60 Chisholm, 1976,208. This paper in general furnishes abundant evidence that late Bren-
tano was working using whole-part theoretic considerations akin to those we find in 
Husserl, which is not surprising, given his influences on his pupils, in particular Hus-
serl's former teacher Stumpf. Unfortunately we have not here the space to compare 
Hussed and Brentano at length. 
61 The example, though not the application of it, is drawn from Ingarden, 1964/5, § 15. 
The idea of disjunctive satisfaction of requirements clearly has applications in biology. 
The importance of such biological considerations is urged in the Preface to Wiggins, 
1967. 
62 Because Chisholm denies that a genuine entity may lose parts, he must construe organ-
isms and machines as less than genuine. with an identity which is a simulacrum of true 
identity. Cf. Chisholm, 1976. This is a thought which can be found inter alia in Hume 
and Leibniz, and in a modified form pervades extensional mereology. It is certainly at-
tractive, and more tractable than the Aristotelian alternative, but I am convinced it is 
wrong. 
63 § 13. LUII/l 258, LI460. 
64 Ginsberg 1929, 112. Cf. also my prefatory note to her paper in this volume. 
65 Wiggins uses this consideration in his 1980 to discredit the idea that a cat can be ident-
ical with the mereological sum of its body + its tail, for the cat, but not the sum, could 
lose the tail. 
66 As suggested in Kripke, 1972, 312 f. 
67 This notation for the proper ancestral is due to Carnap. Cf. his 1954, § 36. 
68 §14, LUIIll 262, LI464. 
69 On Frege's use of whole-part terminology to describe the phenomenon which he calls 
'unsaturatedness' of predicates and concepts see his late essays" Die Verneinung" and 
"Gedankengeruge" , Frege, 1976a. I have expanded elsewhere on the appropriateness 
of using Husserlian ideas in this connection. Frege's use of terms like 
'ergiinzungsbediirftig'. unlike that of Husserl, is not backed by a theory of dependent 
and independent parts. Indeed, if we are to believe his remarks in Frege, 1895, Frege 
had a rather low opinion of whole-part theory in general. 
70 § 14, LUIIIl 263, LI464. We have adjusted the symbolism to our convention. 
71 Ginsberg, 1929. 
72 Cf. Meinong, 1899. 
73 On categorial unities see § 23, for instance. The notion can be found throughout Hus-
sed's writings. 
74 Ingarden, 19,64/5, § 15, n. 
75 Findlay, 1963, 148f. 
76 The idea of separate presentation here derives from Stumpf, 1873. Cf. § 3 for Husserl's 
comments, and the historical remarks in Ginsberg's paper in this volume. 
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17 §25, LVII/I 292, LI488. 
78 Findlay, 1963, 150. 
79 The Prague and Moscow schools of linguistics were in fact influenced by the third in-
vestigation. Cf. Jakobson, 1973, 13-4, Holenstein, 1975. 
80 Cf. Pantin, 1968, 37f. 
I I Aristotle, 1930, 292a 19f. 
82 § 11 , LVII/l 253, LI456. 
13 Ibid. 
14 As mentioned in n. 46 above. 
IS Cf. Findlay, 1963, 141f. Husserl in fact makes a very similar distinction between two 
sorts of relation in Husserl, 1887 and 1891 a. His terminology is however more unf ortu-
nate, since he calls the relations 'physical' and 'psychical' rather than 'real' and 'ideal' . 
The term 'psychical' indicates not that the relation is mental, but that it is of a sort with 
the relation between object and content of an idea. Cf. Findlay, 1963,35, where it is 
made clear that the mental relation is ideal for Meinong. The terminology of Husserl 
readily misled Frege into criticising Hussert's theory of number as psycho logistic, 
which it was not. For a clear refutation of the myth of Husserl's early psychologism see 
Willard, 1974. We have, for obvious reasons, adopted the less misleading terminology 
of Meinong. 
86 Cf. the arguments against reflexive relatedness in Vol. 2 of Armstrong, 1978,91 f . 
• 7 Hume, 1978, Book I, Pt. IV, § II, p. 200f. Wittgenstein, 1961 , 5.53f. 
as Cf. Quine, 1960, § 24. 
